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The current execution of privacy policies, as a mode of 
communicating information to users, is unsatisfactory. Social 
networking sites (SNS) exemplify this issue, attracting growing 
concerns regarding their use of personal data and its effect on user 
privacy. This demonstrates the need for more informative policies. 
However, SNS lack the incentives required to improve policies, 
which is exacerbated by the difficulties of creating a policy that is 
both concise and compliant. Standardization addresses many of 
these issues, providing benefits for users and SNS, although it is 
only possible if policies share attributes which can be standardized. 
This investigation used thematic analysis and cross- document 
structure theory, to assess the similarity of attributes between the 
privacy policies (as available in August 2014), of the six most 
frequently visited SNS globally. Using the Jaccard similarity 
coefficient, two types of attribute were measured; the clauses used 
by SNS and the coverage of forty recommendations made by the 
UK Information Commissioner’s Office. Analysis showed that 
whilst similarity in the clauses used was low, similarity in the 
recommendations covered was high, indicating that SNS use 
different clauses, but to convey similar information. The analysis 
also showed that low similarity in the clauses was largely due to 
differences in semantics, elaboration and functionality between 
SNS. Therefore, this paper proposes that the policies of SNS already 
share attributes, indicating the feasibility of standardization and five 
recommendations are made to begin facilitating this, based on the 
findings of the investigation. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.5.2 [Information Interfaces and Presentation]: User Interfaces 
– Standardization; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: Public Policy 
Issues – Privacy 
General Terms 
Human Factors, Standardization, Theory, Legal Aspects.    
Keywords 
Privacy Policies, Standardization, Web Science, Data Protection, 
Social Networking Sites. 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Technological advancements, including the creation of the web, 
have dramatically increased the potential of personal data [24], 
which has lead to concerns over the effect of this on user privacy. 
To some extent, Data Protection laws have been used to strike the 
balance between the rights of individuals to privacy and the ability 
of organizations to use personal data [24]. One right given to data 
subjects under the EU Data Protection Directive [12] is the right to 
information about the nature of processing of their personal data, 
leading to the adoption of privacy policies. However, despite the 
many benefits of a well-executed privacy policy, their current role 
in informing users about the use of their data has been heavily 
criticized [19]. The growing concern SNS attract regarding their use 
of personal data and its effect on user privacy [3] highlights the 
need for more informative policies. However, SNS lack the 
incentive to improve policies, which is only exacerbated by the 
difficulties which creating a policy that is both concise and 
compliant entail. As a suggestion for improvement, the 
standardization of privacy policies of SNS, addresses many of these 
issues [10]. However, standardization is only possible if policies 
share attributes on which standards can be built. Therefore, using 
thematic analysis [8] and cross-document structure theory [1] our 
research investigates the similarity of the privacy policies of SNS 
and answers the following research questions: Firstly, what is the 
similarity, between the privacy policies of the top six SNS globally, 
in the clauses they use? Secondly, what is the similarity between the 
privacy policies of the top six SNS globally, in the coverage of forty 
recommendations, made by the UK Information Commissioners 
Office (ICO)? Thirdly, is standardization possible between the 
privacy policies of SNS? 
2. RELATED WORK  
2.1 Privacy Policies  
Also called privacy notices, privacy policies are the explanations 
individuals are given when information is collected about them [16]. 
However, in reality, their role in informing users is unsatisfactory. 
They have been heavily criticized for being too long [19], legalistic, 
complex [16] and ineffective in helping users understand their rights 
[26], all of which result in them not being read, defeating their 
underlying purpose. Arguably, organizations are complicit in this, 
as with individuals still using their services, they lack strong 
incentives to improve privacy policies. Even with incentives, 
creating a policy that is both concise and compliant is not easy, 
given the supranational nature of the web, where data is processed 
in numerous jurisdictions, each with differing requirements [24]. 
However, if executed well, privacy policies can promote 
transparency and reduce information asymmetry [30]. As a risk 
trade-off decision [15], in a world increasingly worried about risk 
[4], privacy policies can communicate information enabling users to 
make effective choices regarding their personal data. Indeed, 
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evidence suggests that users are privacy aware and active [7], just 
that they do not view privacy policies as a means of expressing 
consent [23]. Social Networking Sites (SNS) are a prime example of 
the need for informative privacy policies. A product of Web 2.0, 
SNS allow users to upload and share content, and an influential 
factor in their popularity is that they are free to use [27]. However, 
as businesses, the trade-off for free use is the data harvested from 
users. However, a 2011 survey [28] found that 72% of social 
network users worry that they are giving away too much data 
online. Indeed, it is not just the data users willingly share, or the 
data gathered without users knowing which SNS can access, but 
also the information they can infer about users. A recent study 
found that publicly available Facebook ‘likes’ could be used to 
predict a variety of attributes, including ethnic origin, religious 
beliefs and sexual orientation [18]. Therefore, although SNS rely on 
personal data, it is questionable how much data this entitles them to, 
especially given the criticisms they have received, including of the 
wide licenses they have imposed [3]. Thus, improving the privacy 
policies of SNS, as the second most frequently visited type of 
website [2], will benefit numerous users. Various suggestions have 
been made to improve privacy policies including using 
visualizations to aid communication [5] and taking an approach 
similar to the creative commons model [23]. Alternatively, a 
technical approach could be taken, such as making privacy policies 
machine-readable, as was the aim of the Platform for Privacy 
Preferences Project (P3P) [20]. Despite achieving limited adoption 
[20], some believe P3P-based techniques have considerable 
potential, the challenge being to design formalized privacy policy 
languages [20]. If achieved, an intelligent recommender system 
could be used to help users make decisions about their online 
privacy, combining user data and policies to provide 
recommendations for privacy management to the user [22]. 
2.2 Standardization  
As a suggestion, standardization has the most potential here, 
offering benefits to various stakeholders as well as beginning the 
groundwork for other improvements. Benefits for users include 
facilitating comparisons between policies and allowing consumers 
to become familiar with terminology and the locations of particular 
types of information [10]. Benefits to organizations include 
allowing them to verify compliance with the law [10] and reducing 
the hassle of creating the policies completely on their own. 
Standardization also allows for large-scale analysis of privacy 
policies [11], allowing regulators and researchers to assess 
compliance and move away from human annotation, which is 
required to understand and compare privacy policies (as in this 
study). Standardizing elements of policies also begins the 
groundwork for other suggested improvements by beginning the 
process of information reduction and refinement required to develop 
formalized privacy policy languages [20], or standardized 
descriptions for a creative commons approach [23]. However, 
standardization requires policies to have shared attributes. Given the 
fragmented evolution of SNS privacy policies, in their creation by 
different organizations, combined with the differing legal 
requirements between jurisdictions, the shared attributes required 
may not be present in the policies in their current form. Therefore, 
prior to attempting standardization, it is important to assess 
similarity of the data in question, to ascertain whether 
standardization is possible. 
3. METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Selection of the Data   
To assess the similarity between SNS, the most frequently visited 
SNS (as ranked by Alexa.com [2], a web analytics website that 
publishes a global traffic rank for major websites) were chosen, as 
these attract the most users. Alexa.com allows visitors to browse 
websites by category and their category ‘Social Networking’ was 
used for the purpose of this investigation. As the top five websites in 
‘Social Networking’ were also ranked in the top thirty of all 
websites globally, they were included, in addition to the next ranked 
SNS, giving a total of six. The seventh ranked website in ‘Social 
Networking’ was ranked 175th of all websites, this and all others 
were excluded from the investigation. As a result, the six SNS 
selected for investigating were: Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, 
Google+, Pinterest and Flickr. Because online privacy policies are 
made of numerous layers and links to further information, the scope 
of the investigation was limited to the ‘first layer’. This was because 
the familiarization stage of the investigation (at Stage 1) revealed a 
large amount of repetition and circularity in further layers. Neither 
Facebook nor Google provided a separate ‘first layer’. When you 
clicked on their ‘privacy’ or ‘privacy policy’ tab, their policies were 
broken into sections, with an option to download complete versions. 
Therefore, the complete versions were chosen as the ‘first layer’ 
because looking at one section would have created a confounding 
variable. All other ‘first layers’ were treated as first screen shown 
when the ‘privacy’ or ‘privacy policy’ tabs were clicked. 
3.2 Measuring Similarity    
With the aim of the investigation being to measure similarity as a 
precursor to standardization, it was important to select the 
appropriate attributes to measure. In terms of granularity, whilst 
attributes such as words could be compared, the clauses used by the 
SNS proved an appropriate attribute, as they convey enough 
information to make comparison meaningful. A ‘clause’ is defined 
as ‘a part of a treaty, law or contract’ [21]. Whilst it may be useful 
for other investigations to compare how many times the word 
‘privacy’ appears, here it would not provide a meaningful measure 
of similarity on which the potential for standardization could be 
assessed. A second attribute was also measured for similarity, the 
coverage of forty recommendations from the UK Information 
Commissioner’s Office ‘Privacy notices code of practice’ [16]. The 
code provides recommendations, which aim to help websites 
comply with the UK Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) [14], the 
implementation of the EU Data Protection Directive in the UK. EU 
and UK law was chosen as the framework for which to compare the 
privacy policies against in this investigation primarily for two 
reasons. Firstly, that the DPD provides a single law, aimed at 
harmonizing data protection laws throughout the European Union. 
Therefore, although differing implementations between member 
states (who are left to decide the means to achieve the aims of the 
Directive) sometimes result in slight nuances between the individual 
implementations, compliance with the UK DPA can, to a certain 
extent, indicate findings about the rest of the EU. In comparison, the 
US has no single comprehensive federal (national) law so findings 
of similarity of the privacy policies with individual laws are not as 
widely applicable. Secondly, comparing the policies of US-based 
SNS with the EU and UK law provides for an interesting 
juxtaposition and strengthens conclusions about the possibility of a 
global standardized policy. A combination of thematic analysis and 
cross-document structure theory (CST) were used in this 
investigation. Thematic analysis [8] is used to pinpoint, examine 
and record themes within data and occurs in the six stages outlined 
below. Cross-document structure theory [1] is a formal discourse 
theory for multi-document analysis, which establishes relationships 
among segments of different documents about the same topic. 
Similarity for both attributes was measured using Jaccard’s 
similarity coefficient, a statistic used for comparing the similarity of 
sample sets. It is defined as the size of the intersection divided by 
the size of the union of the sample sets [17]. 
Stage 1: Familiarization with data: At this stage, researchers 
immerse themselves in the data, gaining familiarity with its depth 
and breadth [8]. Therefore, the policies were read multiple times, 
first passively then actively, recognizing meanings and patterns. 
Stage 2: Generating Initial Codes: This phase involved the 
production of initial ‘codes’ from the data, defined as ‘the most 
basic segment of the raw data that can be assessed in a meaningful 
way regarding the phenomenon’ [6]. Unlike some legal documents, 
privacy policies are only broken into sections, requiring the clauses 
to be identified. As the thematic analysis definition of ‘code’ and 
the (above) definition of ‘clause’ were compatible, this stage was 
used to identify the atomic clauses in the policies. The policies were 
divided into sentences and beginning with Facebook (as the longest 
policy) a table was created, initially treating each sentence as a 
clause. Sentences were then examined to see whether multiple 
sentences needed to be combined to form a clause, or whether 
multiple clauses were contained within one sentence. The clauses 
resulting from this formed the initial list of clauses. Here a 
technique from CST was introduced and sentence pairs were 
examined [25], similar to the thematic analysis ‘compare and 
contrast approach’ [13]. All other policies were also split into 
sentences and each sentence pair was compared individually asking 
each time; what is the sentence about? What question is it trying to 
answer? Is it equivalent to the examined clause in these respects? 
Would adding or subtracting information from the same privacy 
policy make the clause equivalent?   
   Once all policies had been worked 
through, the table was repeatedly checked until no more clauses 
were moved, known as achieving theoretical saturation [29]. As a 
result of breaking the policies down into atomic clauses, each clause 
could only be coded once (i.e. only be classed equal to one other 
clause) unlike other applications of thematic analysis, which code 
individual extracts of data into numerous codes. During this stage, 
some information from the policies was removed, such as duplicate 
clauses in the same policy, sub-headings mentioned in the body of 
the text and sentences preceding lists. For example, the subheading 
‘your information’ was removed from Facebook when the first line 
in the section began ‘your information is’. However, ‘Information 
for users outside the United States and Canada’ was left in because 
following this, only contact information was provided, so the 
subheading was required for context. Removing these was to 
normalize the data, because including them could inflate the number 
of clauses some SNS had and skew the results. 
Stage 3: Searching for Themes Among Codes: This phase re- 
focuses the analysis at broader themes and involved sorting the 
clauses into potential themes [8]. Rather than inductively producing 
the themes from the clauses, forty ICO Code [16] recommendations 
were used as themes into which the data was placed. The code states 
that it can be used as a list for organizations to check their privacy 
policies against, so it was parsed manually and forty-six 
recommendations were identified (also using the process of Stages 1 
and 2 of this investigation). Although forty-six were identified, six 
were too broad or vague to assess e.g. ‘Any further information 
necessary, in the specific circumstances, to enable the processing in 
respect of the individual to be fair’. They were removed, leaving 
forty themes for analysis. Each one of the clauses from Stage 2 was 
then placed into at least one of the forty categories, or into a 
category of ‘miscellaneous’. The focus here was to see whether the 
privacy policies contained information, which addressed the theme, 
not whether the privacy policy was legally compliant with the 
recommendation. For example, one of the forty ICO code 
recommendations was: ‘Obtain assurances (in form of written 
agreements) from any organizations you share personal information 
with about what they will do with the information and what the 
effect on people is likely to be’. Two clauses coded into this 
recommendation LinkedIn’s privacy policy were:  
• ‘These third-party developers have either negotiated an 
agreement to use LinkedIn platform technology or have 
agreed to our self-service API and Plugin terms in order 
to build applications (“Platform Applications”)’.  
• ‘Both the negotiated agreements and our API and Plugin 
terms contain restrictions on how third parties may 
access, store, and use the personal information you 
provide to LinkedIn’.  
Although this meant that LinkedIn included information in its 
privacy policy, which addressed the recommendation, it would take 
further investigation (outside the scope of this paper) to assess 
whether the assurances obtained are legally compliant and therefore 
whether LinkedIn complies with the recommendation in full or just 
addresses an aspect of it.   
Stage 4: Reviewing Themes: This stage involves two levels. Level 
one involves reading the collated extracts for each theme and 
considering whether they appear to form a coherent pattern [8]. If 
not, the researcher considers whether the theme is problematic or 
whether the data simply does not fit there, in which case, the theme 
can be re-worked. Level two involves a similar process but in 
relation to the whole data set [8]. Because the themes used here 
were pre-determined from the ICO Code, all this stage required was 
to check that each clause had been allocated to a recommendation 
correctly. 
Stage 5: Defining and Naming Themes: In this stage, themes are 
named and content of the theme is paraphrased, clearly defining 
what themes are and are not [8]. As with the previous stage, because 
the themes were pre-determined and (as recommendations) defined 
already by the ICO code (thematic codes were essentially the 
recommendations themselves), this stage was not required. The 
definitions the code provided allowed me to state categorically 
whether a privacy policy had addressed a recommendation or not, 
giving me the binary classification required to use Jaccard’s 
Coefficient. Table 1 shows three examples of code 












Example of Clause 
Tell people how 
long you or other 
organizations 
intend to keep the 
data. 
The privacy policy refers 
to how long it (or 
organizations it shares 
the data with) intend to 
keep the data for.  
‘Typically, information 
associated with your 
account will be kept until 
your account is deleted’. 
Facebook 
Tell people who 
their information 
will be shared 
with/ disclosed to.  
The privacy policy 
advises who users 
information will be 
shared with/ disclosed to. 
‘Secret boards are 
visible to you and other 
participants in the 
board, and any 
participant may choose 
to make the contents of 
the board available to 
anyone else’.     
Pinterest 
Tell people the 
purpose for using 
the information. 
The privacy policy tells 
the user the purpose for 
using the information. 
(If you email us, we may 
keep your message, 
email address and 
contact information) 
to respond to your 
request.  Twitter 
 
Stage 6: Producing the Final Report: Here the story of the data is 
told and this can be found in the next three sections. 
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
Table 2 displays the results from Stage 2 showing how many 
clauses were identified initially, how many were removed and the 
remaining number of clauses, which were assessed for similarity. 
Table 2: Number of clauses identified, removed and remaining 
 
From Table 2 it can be seen that Facebook and LinkedIn ’s ‘first 
layer’ included significantly more clauses than the other SNS. 
Google (ranked third in descending order of number of clauses) had 
less than half the number of LinkedIn (ranked second). 
Interestingly, there is no direct relationship between the number of 
clauses identified and the number of clauses removed, indicating 
that the length of the policy did not necessitate repetition.  
Table 2 also shows that although the descending order of SNS in 
terms of the number of clauses identified and number of clauses 
remaining stays the same (Facebook, LinkedIn, Google+, Twitter, 
Pinterest, Flickr), the order varies in terms of the number and 
percentage of clauses removed. Flickr in particular had just over a 
quarter of its clauses removed, which given only 89 were 
identified to begin with (the lowest), is a significant amount. 
4.1 Similarity in Clause Coverage  
Graph 1 shows evidence of a power-law relationship between the 
number of clauses and how many policies they appear in. 
Generally, as the number of clauses examined increases, the 
number of SNS they can be found in decreases. Although, there is 
an increase (rather than decrease) in the number of common 
clauses as the number of SNS increases from five to six, few 
empirical phenomena obey power laws for all values [9]. 
Clause Coverage 
Graph 1: Shows number of clauses covered by SNS  
In answering research question 1 (section 1), Table 3 shows that 
the similarity between the SNS in the clauses they use was low. 
The least similar were Flickr and Facebook with 8% similarity 
and the most similar were Pinterest and Twitter with 27% 
similarity. Average similarity was 15%. 
Table 3: Jaccard Similarity of Clause Coverage 
  
Interestingly, Table 2 shows that Facebook and Flickr were at 
separate ends of the continuum in terms of number of clauses, 
with Facebook having the most and Flickr the least. This may 
explain their dissimilarity. Whereas, Table 2 shows that Pinterest 
and Twitter sit next to each other on this continuum, with a similar 
number of clauses, which may be why they have a higher 
similarity. Three prominent reasons for differences between SNS 
in the clauses they used were: 
• Functionality: Differences in functionality between 
SNS, such as LinkedIn ’s use of Polls and Facebook’s 
‘Instant Personalization’, resulted in a number of 
clauses communicating these, which other SNS would 
not include because they do not offer the functionality. 
• Semantics: Different words were often used to discuss 
the same topics without being defined. When discussing 
account termination, the words ‘close’, ‘delete’ and 
‘deactivate’ were used across the policies. Facebook 
confirmed ‘delete’ meant permanent deletion but 
Pinterest only stated users could ‘close your account at 
any time’. Without defining ‘close’, it was difficult to 
ascertain whether the clauses were comparable, meaning 
they had to be treated as different. 
• Elaboration: Some SNS elaborated on certain topics 
more than others. For example, although all SNS 
included a link to follow if users had any questions, 
comments or complaints, some also included their 
physical address and information regarding the 
procedure. Equally, SNS provided definitions and 
examples of varying length and content for technical 
terms. For example, only Pinterest and Twitter 
elaborated on the definition of cookies to mean 
‘persistent’ and ‘session’ cookies, which resulted 
in additional clauses, not present in other policies. 
4.2 Similarity in Recommendation Coverage  
Interestingly, Graph 2 shows that the largest percentages of 
recommendations covered, were for those covered by either none 
of (22.5%), or all six SNS (30%). These percentages combined 
account for over half of the recommendations and show similarity 
between SNS in the recommendations of the code that they do and 
do not address. 
   
Graph 2: Shows number of recommendations covered by SNS 
Unlike Graph 1, there is no evidence of a power-law relationship 
in Graph 2 between the number of SNS and how many code 
recommendations they address, rather that the majority of 




Table 4: Jaccard Similarity in Covering Code 
Recommendations 
 C FB P T F L G+ 
ICO Code (C)   0.58 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.65 0.65 
Facebook (FB)   0.52 0.68 0.68 0.81 0.63 
Pinterest (P)    0.76 0.61 0.52 0.69 
Twitter (T)     0.65 0.61 0.66 
Flickr (F)      0.66 0.61 
LinkedIn (L)        0.68 
Google+ (G+)        
 
Table 4 shows the similarity of SNS with the Code, ranges from 
45-65% (of course the code includes 100% of recommendations). 
This may be because the recommendations are based on the EU 
and UK Data Protection Framework and none of the SNS are 
based within the UK. Whereas, in answer to research question 2 
(section 1), Table 4 shows that similarity, between SNS in 
addressing the code recommendations, ranges from 52% - 81%. 
This evidences a higher percentage of similarity amongst SNS in 
the specific recommendations they addressed, than their overall 
similarity with the code. These percentages corroborate with 
Graph 2, in showing that there were certain recommendations that 
SNS collectively did or did not address.  
 However, failing to address a recommendation and a 
lower similarity with the code does not necessitate non-
compliance with it. Failing to cover a recommendation could be 
for one of two reasons: because it was not applicable, or it was 
applicable, but the SNS failed to address it. For example, none of 
the SNS explicitly addressed the recommendation that ‘Where 
individuals are required by law to provide personal details, be 
open and explain why information is being collected and what it 
will be used for’ i.e. none of the privacy policies explicitly stated 
that individuals were required by law to provide certain personal 
details. This may be because individuals are not required by law 
to provide SNS with personal details or equally, because 
individuals are, but SNS failed to explicitly address this in their 
policy. However, which scenario is correct cannot be ascertained 
without further investigation and without access to information 
which SNS often do not divulge in full, such as what data the SNS 
collects and whether this is collection is required by law.  
 Table 4 also shows that the least similar (with each 
other) were jointly Facebook and Pinterest (52%) and LinkedIn 
and Pinterest (52%) and the most similar were Facebook and 
LinkedIn (81%). Interestingly, Facebook and LinkedIn had the 
highest numbers of clauses (Table 2) and although Pinterest did 
not have the lowest, it did have the second lowest with only 21 
more than Flickr who had 66 (Table 2). This indicates that the 
more clauses SNS have, the more ICO recommendations they are 
likely to share. However, as stated above, failing to address 
recommendations is not indicative of non-compliance and 
therefore a lesser length should not be assumed to mean a less 
compliant policy. 
5. DISCUSSION  
Based on the results of this investigation, in answering research 
question 3, this paper asserts that standardization is possible 
between the privacy policies of SNS, although standardization by 
clause may not be appropriate initially. However, thematic 
similarity suggests standardization is feasible and based on the 
findings of this investigation five recommendations are made below 
to facilitate this. 
1. Begin with an as-exhaustive-as-possible list of themes, 
which a SNS should address rather than focusing on 
clauses initially. Because the investigation showed that 
similarity was far higher between the policies in the 
recommendations they covered than the clauses they 
used, SNS policies are already in a position to begin to be 
standardized by theme. This could form a visually 
familiar table for users as a first step, consisting of two 
columns, with the list of standardized themes on the left 
and the SNS clauses allocated to those themes on the 
right. In addition to looking at the legal requirements and 
the advice of data protection authorities to create this list 
of themes, the privacy policies should also be examined 
as a source.  
2. General functionality and functionality specific to that 
website should appear as separate themes. General 
functionality would include functionality common to all 
websites (such as log data) and website- specific 
functionality would include functionality only that SNS 
offer. Then users could easily identify differences 
between SNS by looking at the website- specific 
functionality theme, in addition to familiarizing 
themselves with standard collections of data by websites 
in the general functionality theme. 
3. Definitions, explanations and examples of technical 
terms should be standardized so that each policy uses 
the same ones. Given that it is almost impossible to avoid 
using technical terms in relation to SNS, at least by doing 
this, the amount or type of information a user gets in this 
context will not vary with the SNS they use, lessening 
confusion and possibly supporting familiarity with 
definitions and examples. 
4. Certain words should also be standardized. For 
example, close, delete and deactivate should not be used 
interchangeably, but either one word is used or their 
individual, but separate, definitions (in relation to 
terminating an account on a SNS) should be standardized 
i.e. close account always means one thing as does delete 
account. 
5. Make sure that when standardizing, there is a way for 
users to easily ascertain when a theme is not addressed 
and why. As mentioned, if a theme was not covered it 
was unclear whether this was because it was not 
applicable or because the SNS simply failed to do so. 
Fulfilling this recommendation would solve that issue, 
making SNS justifications clear to users, regulators and 
researchers. 
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Therefore, with the aim here being to assess the similarity between 
the privacy policies of the top six SNS, as a precursor for 
standardization, this paper proposes that the privacy policies of SNS 
demonstrate homogeneity and promising potential for 
standardization. 
In answering research question one, analysis initially showed that 
similarity between the policies in the clauses they used was low. 
However, in answering research question two, analysis of a second 
attribute showed that similarity between SNS was far higher in the 
themes of information addressed. This showed that SNS express 
similar themes of information, but in different ways. This analysis 
enabled the answer to research question three, which was that SNS 
evidence the shared attributes required for standardization to be 
possible and that by following the recommendations in the previous 
section, SNS could begin by standardizing their policies by theme 
and then begin looking at the possibility of standardizing clauses 
within themes, beginning with certain definitions and the theme of 
‘general functionality’. Although standardization by clause is not 
currently feasible, because of the low similarity in clauses, the 
analysis showed that the differences in clause coverage were largely 
due to differences in functionality, semantics and elaboration 
between SNS. Overcoming these, with the recommendations in the 
previous section, would allow for another assessment of similarity 
to investigate the potential for standardization by clause.  
Future works in this area could also extend the analysis to further 
layers of the policies, or conduct inter-rater reliability or intra-rater 
reliability on the findings. An extension of the work could also 
measure similarity against thematic codes which are a superset of 
legal requirements from multiple jurisdictions or compare the 
similarity with a different type of website such as those operating 
under a chargeable business model. Further investigations could 
(where the information is available) also look to clarify the 
ambiguous clauses discovered in the analysis to enable meaningful 
conclusions on them. Finally, whilst the aim of this paper was to 
assess the possibility of standardization, the recommendations made 
as an outcome of this investigation could be followed up with 
further work into how to put these into practice. Standardizing the 
privacy policies of SNS would be a major success for individual 
management of personal data online. Our work demonstrates that 
this is possible and we hope it will result in a step closer to the 
standardization of privacy policies of SNS in the future.  
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